

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SA/DCI

Joe:

Not knowing what
DCI had in mind re
this I have given no further
distribution. If OK w/
Mr. Casey it should go
to DDCI DDI DDO C/NLC
for info. Pls advise

Tom

Date

6/21/82

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

GPO : 1981 O - 345-783

State Dept. review completed

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		has seen		
2	DDCI		✓		
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5	DDI		✓		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		✓		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		✓		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EE0				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
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Remarks:

*Replaced
GK file*

Executive Secretary

6/23/82

Date

JSC

Executive Registry

82-5333

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1982

TO: CIA - Mr. Casey

Dear Bill:

As promised, here is my report to the President on my second meeting with Gromyko which took place this morning in New York.

Warm regards,


Alexander M. Haig

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1982

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AMH*
SUBJECT: My Session with Gromyko, June 19

Today's session lasted four and a third hours, and was devoted largely to regional issues as I had planned. And, as I expected, it was as rough as yesterday's meeting.

We went over the whole gamut of U.S. regional concerns, from Poland to Kampuchea, and also discussed the Middle East at his initiative.

On Poland, Gromyko listened impassively while I stated our position on the problems and the prospects, and offered no indication of give. But he reacted bitterly to your decision to extend sanctions, as announced in the newspapers. He complained that it coincided with our meeting, claimed it represented economic warfare, and predicted it would spill over into political relations, since they cannot be separated. Agreeing with the last point, I explained that business-as-usual is impossible and that economic relations cannot improve so long as Soviet behavior in Poland, Afghanistan, etc., remains unchanged.

On Afghanistan, Gromyko gave no hint of a change in the Soviet position. As you and I agreed, however, I did suggest that Ambassador Hartman conduct intensified bilateral discussions in Moscow in July, and Gromyko agreed.

The exchange on Central America and the Caribbean was standard: I reiterated the dangers we see and the importance of the issue in our relationship, with particular reference to Soviet military shipments, while Gromyko insisted once again that we must settle with the locals, but that the Soviets will not stand in the way.

Southern Africa presented the one slight ray of hope in an otherwise somber meeting. Gromyko continued to

SECRET/SENSITIVE

RDS-1 6/21/02

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

hint that the Soviets would be willing to stand aside from a Namibia settlement which included a Cuban withdrawal from Angola. His major concern seemed to be the stability of the Angola Government and the threat from Savimbi. I told him that reconciliation among the factions in Angola is something the parties must work out themselves. The Soviets understand that we are working hard for a genuine settlement, and that they will bear the onus for failure if it fails.

On the Middle East, Gromyko repeated all the familiar Soviet claims and proposals about the area. They are obviously smarting from the beating their clients have taken. I made clear that we are working hard on the problem, and remain the only major power capable of moving the disputes of the area toward settlement. Gromyko did raise the possibility that the Soviets will call again for an international conference, and this is something we should be watching carefully in the days ahead.

Toward the end of the meeting Gromyko raised the possibility of a summit. I expressed regret that Brezhnev had not been able to attend the SSOD and meet with you, and explained that much would depend on future developments and the possibility of carefully prepared results. He did not seem entirely satisfied, concluding that we should let them know when we have chosen a date and place. For obvious political reasons, I think, the Soviets are anxious to have a summit as soon as possible.

Gromyko also returned to the question of respecting SALT II commitments, asking for more precise details about what you meant when you said we would not undercut existing agreements as long as they do not. I was deliberately vague in response, saying we are comfortable with existing policy, and any questions should be discussed by our negotiators in Geneva.

Finally, I made a pitch on humanitarian issues with special reference to Jewish emigration, citing your interest and pointing out that small gestures in this field can have a disproportionately large payoff in overall relations.

It was a wearing meeting, but useful, and not only in the sense that it registered the fact of superpower

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

dialogue in tense times. It built on the momentum you have created in our favor in recent days and weeks by presenting a sensible, full-scale program for arms control negotiations and getting Allied support for it by making absolutely clear to the Soviets that our full agenda is intact, and that we will not be able to move forward on a broad front unless they are willing to take all our concerns into account -- regional security, military security, human rights and other bilateral issues -- and act on them.

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